The Physical, the Subjective, and the Social in the Debate on Personal Identity: A Critical and Historical Overview of Neo-Lockean Accounts: Lo físico, lo subjetivo y lo social en el debate sobre la identidad personal: Una visión crítica e histórica de las teorías neolockeanas
Keywords:
Personal identity, neo-Lockean theories, History, NarrativismCopyright (c) 2021 Alejandro Borrás Ruiz
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Abstract
There are, at least, three fundamental
dimensions in what we all are: a physical,
a mental and a social dimension. In this
paper I will focus in how, in the history
of the debate about personal identity, different neo-Lockean theories have tried
to account for these dimensions. The
main goal will be to show that the only
neo-Lockean theory that can account for
these dimensions is what I call the New
Narrative Approach, that establishes a
distinction between three entities that
we are: human beings, selves, and persons.
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