Keywords:
Practical rationality, scientific rationality, justification, epistemic normativity, fallibilism, moral progressCopyright (c) 2015 Julen Ibarrondo Murguialday

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Abstract
When analyzing what constitutes practical reasoning, many philosophers have argued that it cannot be taken as just another field of rational deliberation. They point out what seems to be a discontinuity between moral and scientific discourse. This article critiques that position and defends an integrative view of rationality that allows for moral deliberation. Some derived considerations about the nature of practical rationality are also given, defending both the fallible character of morality as well as the possibility of progress.
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