The role of argumentation in disabling epistemic prejudice and epistemic injustice
Keywords:
argumentative activism, epistemic activism, epistemic injustice, prejudice, epistemic virtueCopyright (c) 2024 Revista Iberoamericana de Argumentación
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Abstract
n this paper I will explore the problem of resistance to evidence that hinders the elimination of identity prejudice and
the importance of argumentation in combating it. First, I will analyse the relationship between Frickerian notions of
identity power and stereotype with argumentative injustice and the activity of arguing. I will argue that argumentation
is a ubiquitous element in debates about epistemic injustice, although it is not identical to argumentative injustice.
Next, I will address the notion of prejudice and the importance of critical-argumentative efforts to unmask it. I will
argue that the context of debate of epistemic injustices is disagreement, so that argumentative exchange is necessary
even to establish what is meant by epistemic virtue and the need to exercise it. Finally, I will argue that this kind of
exchange should be understood as a variant of what J. Medina calls "epistemic activism".
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References
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