Mots-clés :
argumentation, beliefs, epistemology, epistemic injustice, Simion(c) Tous droits réservés Bondy Patrick 2025
Cette œuvre est sous licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.
Résumé
This paper introduces a problem relating to hermeneutical injustice that is grounded in epistemic basing failure. Mona Simion has recently argued for an extension of Miranda Fricker’s concept of hermeneutical injustice, to cover cases where subjects have good reasons for important beliefs available to them, but they fail to form the relevant beliefs. This paper further argues that hermeneutical injustices can arise in cases where subjects have good reasons available, and they do hold the relevant beliefs that are supported by those reasons, but they fail to hold their beliefs on the basis of the good reasons that are available to them.
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